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Federal Income Tax -Deduction of Legal Expenses -
Re-examination of Public Policy Prohibition
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that
"all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business" shall be allowed
as deductions in computing taxable income. There is no mention in
the tax laws of a possible conflict between public policy and the
allowance of deductions.2 The language of section 162 is generally
held to require only that the expenses be helpful to or proximately
result from the taxpayer's business,' that they be reasonable in
amount,4 and that they be a customary expense of similar enter-
prises.' However, the Internal Revenue Service, the Tax Court, and
the lower federal courts for many years have narrowed the generally
accepted meaning of section 162 in cases involving expenses con-
sidered to be contrary to public policy.! On this ground deductions
have been denied for fines, penalties, and legal fees incurred in con-
nection with unlawful or undesirable business activities.7 A basic
premise has been that:
[D]eductions arise by grace of legislative proviso, and both the Com-
missioner and the courts have taken the position that Congress did not
intend to sanction deductions that would mitigate the penalties imposed
for transgressions of laws or which would lend encouragement to illegal
practices and activities.8
The resulting case law created a judicial amendment to section 162
, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162.
'Stapleton, The Supreme Court Redefines Public Policy, 30 Taxes 641 (1952). The
general prohibition of deductions, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 262, states: "Except as other-
wise expressly provided in this chapter, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or
family expenses."
'Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933); Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145
(1928).
'National Cottonseed Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 839 (6th Cir. 1935).
'Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
However, ordinary expenditures need not be habitual or normal, in the sense that they will
recur in the life of the taxpayer with any degree of frequency. Welch v. Helvering, supra.
02 CCH 1965 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. 5 1330.562.
'E.g., Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958) (fine for over-
loaded truck); National Outdoor Advertising Bureau v. Helvering, 89 F.2d 878 (2d Cir.
1937) (legal expenses incurred in unsuccessfully defending federal antitrust suit); Great
Northern Ry. Co. v. Commissioner, 40 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S.
855 (1930) (fine incurred for violation of Federal Safety Appliance Act).
'Stapleton, The Supreme Court Redefines Public Policy, 30 Taxes 641 (1952).
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to the effect that deductions for "ordinary and necessary" business
expenses otherwise allowable will be denied if the expenses violate
judicial concepts of civic and business morality.! Because the defi-
nition of public policy is vague," the judicial rule has tended to
create uncertainty in the application of the tax laws."
The Supreme Court, in 1952, made a detailed pronouncement on
the deductibility of payments which contravene public policy. Lilly
v. Commissioner" concerned the deductibility of "kickbacks" paid
to doctors by retailers of prescription eyeglasses. The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals had upheld the denial of the deduction by the
Commissioner and by the Tax Court, stating that the "process of
judicial interpretation [of the Internal Revenue Code] had . . .
evolved the rule that no deduction should be allowed as 'ordinary
and necessary' which violates sharply defined public policy."'" On
review, the Supreme Court found that these payments met the
"ordinary and necessary" requirements of section 162 because they
were normal, usual and customary in localities where the taxpayers
were engaged in business, reflected a nationwide practice, and had
enabled the taxpayers to establish and maintain their business. The
Court held that for public policy to preclude the deduction of other-
wise ordinary and necessary business expenses, it must be a national
or state policy "evidenced by some governmental declaration ... ."',
In the years during which the taxpayers paid the kickbacks in ques-
tion, there was no express declaration of public policy, national or
state, proscribing such payments and therefore the deduction was
allowed.
In applying the Lilly test, the courts have uniformly held that
statutes constitute declarations of "sharply defined national or state
policies,"" the general rule being that "fines and penalities for viola-
tions of state or federal statutes are not deductible, even though the
"Id. at 643.
"Id. at 641, 642.
"Reid, Disallowance of Tax Deductions of Grounds of Public Policy--A Critique, 17
Fed. B.J. 575, 579 (1957); and see note 63 infra and accompanying text.
12343 U.S. 90 (1952).
"Lilly v. Commissioner, 188 F.2d 269, 270 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 342 U.S. 808
(1951).
"Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. at 96, 97.
"Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958). "Deduction of fines
and penalties uniformly has been held to frustrate state policy in severe and direct fashion
by reducing the 'sting' of the penalty prescribed by the state legislature." Supra at 35, 36.
See, e.g., United States v. Jaffray, 97 F.2d 488 (8th Cir.), aff~d sub norn. on other grounds,
United States v. Bertelsen & Pertensen Engineering Co., 306 U.S. 276 (1939); Tunnel Ry.
Co. v. Commissioner, 61 F.2d 166 (8th Cir. 1932); Chicago, R.I.&P.Ry. Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 47 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1931); Davenshire, Inc. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 958 (1949).
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commission of the offense was in connection with carrying on a
business."1
Statutes, however, are not the only governmental declarations of
public policy to which the courts have given effect. In Lilly, the
Supreme Court stated that the policies frustrated "must be sharply
defined national or state policies evidenced by some governmental
declaration. . . ."" The courts have long given effect to implied
governmental declarations of public policy.8 One clear example of
this is the denial of legal expenses incurred in the unsuccessful de-
fense of criminal prosecutions.
II. DEDUCTIBILITY OF LEGAL EXPENSES
As early as 1928, '9 it was well settled that the cost of successfully
defending an action at law could be an "ordinary and necessary"
expense of conducting a business and deductible as such for federal
income tax purposes under what is now section 162. However, in
1931, in the first federal court of appeals case raising the question of
deductibility of legal fees for the unsuccessful defense of a criminal
prosecution, the Second Circuit, in Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v.
Commissioner," held that the disallowance of such expenses could
properly rest on grounds of public policy." The public policy referred
to by the court was not stated in the tax laws and had no standard
definition because it was based on the moral considerations which
were the foundation of the judicial amendment to section 162.22
In an attempt to place the denial on statutory grounds, the court
stated that the expenses for an unsuccessful defense against charges
arising from statutory violations might be "ordinary" but could
not be "necessary" because the law would not recognize the necessity
of engaging in illegal actions in the conduct of a business." The
holding in Burroughs authoritatively adopted a distinction, earlier
established by the Board of Tax Appeals, 4 between successful and
unsuccessful defenses of criminal prosecutions, a deduction being
562 CCH 1965 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. 5 1344.316. The general rule holds even for the
great body of state and federal regulatory statutes whose violation may involve no moral
turpitude and which may inadvertently be violated in the course of business. See, Hoover
Motor Express Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 38 (1958) (fine for overloaded truck).
17 343 U.S. at 97. (Emphasis added.)
" See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
19Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145 (1928).
"47 F.2d 178 (2d Cit. 1931).
211d. at 180.
22 See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
23 Ibid.
24 Wolf Mfg. Co., 10 B.T.A. 1161 (1928); Lindheim v. Commissioner, 2 B.T.A. 229
(1925).
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disallowed in case of an unsuccessful defense." Deduction of legal
expenses incurred in civil actions has been uniformly allowed under
section 162 without regard to the success or failure of the defense."
In 1943, the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Heininger,7 indi-
cated that a deduction for legal and related expenses incurred in de-
fending against charges arising from a statutory violation should
be allowed as "ordinary and necessary" expenses under what is now
section 162, even when the defense is unsuccessful. The Court did,
however, qualify its allowance of the deduction by a requirement of
good faith on the defendant's part and reasonableness of the fees."
The case involved an unsuccessful defense against the issuance of a
Post Office Department fraud order, a non-criminal prosecution."
The Court stated that "it had never been thought . . . that the mere
fact that an expenditure bears a remote relation to an illegal act
makes it nondeductible."" ° The Court also declared that "if the . . .
litigation expenses are to be denied deduction, it must be because
the allowance of the deduction would frustrate the sharply defined
policies of . . . [the postal statutes]."'" The policies of the postal
statutes were held not to be frustrated by allowing the deduction of
legal expenses."
Despite the Heininger holding that legal expenses incurred in
defending against charges arising from a statutory violation could
be "ordinary and necessary" under section 162, post-Heininger cases
" Accord, Peckham v. Commissioner, 327 F.2d 855, 856 n.4 (4th Cir. 1964), dis-
cussing MacCrowe's Estate v. Commissioner, 240 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1956); Bell v. Com-
missioner, 320 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1963); Hopkins v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 166, 167
(6th Cir. 1959); Acker v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1958), aff'd on other
grounds, 361 U.S. 87 (1959); National Outdoor Advertising Bureau, Inc. v. Helvering, 89
F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1937); Gould Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 72 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1934);
Commissioner v. Continental Screen Co., 58 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1932); Tracy v. United
States, 284 F.2d 379 (Ct.CI. 1960); Port v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 645 (Ct.CI. 1958).
But see, Foss v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 326 (1st Cir. 1935) (attorney's fees incurred by
stockholder in unsuccessful defense against a Sherman Anti-Trust Act prosecution by mi-
nority stockholders allowed as "ordinary and necessary"). See note 63 infra and accom-
panying text.
2"Hopkins v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 166 (6th Cir. 1959); Helvering v. Hampton,
79 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1935); John W. Clark, 30 T.C. 1330 (1958); International Shoe
Co., 38 B.T.A. 81 (1938); Isaac P. Keeler, 23 B.T.A. 467 (1931).
27320 U.S. 467 (1943).
2S,"Since the record contains no suggestion that the defense was in bad faith or that
the attorney's fees were unreasonable, the expenses incurred in defending the business can
also be assumed appropriate and helpful, and therefore 'necessary.' " Id. at 471.2
'The prosecution was for violation of 39 U.S.C. §§ 259 and 732 (1958), which au-
thorize the Postmaster General to issue fraud orders.
3" 320 U.S. at 474.
I' Ibid.
aa "The single policy of these sections is to protect the public from fraudulent practices
committed through the use of the mails. It is not their policy to impose personal punish-
ment on violators. ... Ibid.
continued to deny deductions for such expenses." The Commissioner
and the federal courts have also failed to apply the Supreme Court's
definitive declaration in Lilly, subsequent cases continuing the dis-
allowance on grounds, inter alia, of public policy.34 Because there is
no express governmental declaration of public policy that would be
frustrated by allowing the deduction of legal expenses associated with
an illegal act, the Internal Revenue Service and the lower federal
courts have followed precedent built on pre-Lilly and pre-Heininger
cases and have thereby given effect to an implied governmental decla-
ration of public policy such as was recognized by the Second Circuit
in Burroughs. The result has been that the tax laws have continued to
be used as an instrument of moral reform to discourage illegal activi-
ties by denying deductions for any expenses associated with them,
even though they may satisfy the statutory requirements for de-
ductibility under section 162.
III. TELLIER V. COMMISSIONER
Tellier v. Commissioner" presented the Second Circuit its first
occasion since Heininger and Lilly to re-examine its rule as to de-
ductibility of legal expenses for an unsuccessful defense of a criminal
prosecution connected with the carrying on of a trade or business.
The taxpayer was tried and convicted on a thirty-six count in-
dictment charging him with violations of the Securities Act of
1933,36 with violations of the mail fraud statute,7 and with con-
spiracy to violate these statutes. 8 He was fined and sentenced to
prison terms. In 1956, the taxpayer claimed a deduction representing
expenditures incurred during that year in his unsuccessful defense
of the criminal prosecution. The Commissioner disallowed this de-
duction and his ruling was sustained by the Tax Court."'
The Second Circuit reversed" the Tax Court and overruled its
33 See note 25 supra and note 63 infra and accompanying text. See, e.g., C. W. Thomas,
16 T.C. 1417 (1951); Simon Bloom, 7 T.C.M. 517 (1948); Anthony Cornero Stralla, 9
TC.. 801 (1947); Cohen v. Commissioner, 2 T.C.M. 602 (1943).
34 See note 25 supra and note 63 infra and accompanying text. See, e.g., Thomas A.
Joseph, 26 T.C. 562 (1956); Estate of Albert MacCrowe, 14 T.C.M. 958 (1955), rev'd on
other grounds, 240 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1956); Union Packing Co., 14 T.C.M. 1188 (1955).
The deduction has been allowed where the legal expenses were for the settlement of crimi-
nal cases. Commissioner v. Schwartz, 232 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1956); Greene Motor Co., 5
T.C. 314 (1945).
35342 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. granted, 382 U.S. 808 (1965).
31Securities Act of 1933, § 17, 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 77q(a)
(1958).
"v Mail Fraud Act, 35 Stat. 1130 (1909), as amended, 18 U.S.C. 5 1341 (1958).
38 Conspiracy Act, 58 Stat. 752 (1944), as amended, 18 U.S.C. 5 371 (1958).
" Walter F. Tellier, 22 T.C.M. 1062 (1963).
40The Second Circuit decided to hear this appeal en banc because the problem it pre-
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prior decision in the Burroughs case. The court refused to "continue
to draw any distinction in deductibility between civil and criminal
cases or between successful and unsuccessful defenses."'" The court
stated the new rule to be "that legal expenses are deductible where
they arise out of and are immediately and proximately connected
with, and are required for, the conduct of a trade or business.
'4 2
The court began its re-examination by stating that the language
of section 162 did not dictate the disallowance of a deduction for
the expenses of an unsuccessful defense of a criminal prosecution
connected with the carrying on of a trade or business, and that no
provisions in the tax laws prohibited such a deduction. 3 The court
said that in denying these expenses the tax authorities were following
a judge-made rule." In order to show that the framers of the tax
legislation did not intend that it should be used for purposes of
moral reform, the court delved into the legislative history of the
original bill and found that the object of the bill was "to tax a
'Alman's net income . . . not to reform men's moral character ... .
Another bit of legislative history deemed relevant by the court was
a portion of the 1951 Congressional Record 6 reporting congressional
rejection of a proposal for disallowing certain deductions for expenses
connected with illegal wagering under section 162. The ground for
rejection was that the Internal Revenue Code was not intended to
penalize or prohibit unlawful activities. The court then explored
relevant congressional debates 7 indicating, in effect, that section 162
is not designed to aid in the enforcement of criminal or regulatory
statutes by augmenting the punishment or penalties expressly pre-
scribed, but is more modestly concerned with "commerical net in-
come. '
The court concluded that the Supreme Court decisions of Heinin-
ger and Lilly had cast doubt on the efficacy of the reasons ordi-
narily given in denying deduction," viz., "that the expenses occasion-
ed by unlawful activities are not ordinary and necessary in the con-
duct of a business and ... that the allowance of a deduction for such
sented was considered to be authoritatively answered by a prior decision of the court in the
Burroughs case. It was felt that a re-examination of the principle upon which that case was
decided should not be undertaken by less than all of the qualified circuit judges.
4' 342 F.2d at 695.
42 Ibid.
"See note 2 supra.
4" See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
41See 50 Cong. Rec. 3849 (1913).
497 Cong. Rec. 12230-44 (1951).
41 See Paul, The Use of Public Policy by the Commissioner in Disallowing Deductions,
Proceedings, Tax Inst. Univ. of So. Calif. School of Law 715, 730-31 (1954).
48 Ibid.
49 342 F.2d at 693.
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expenses would be contrary to public policy.""0 The court cited the
Heininger case, involving a statutory violation, where the Supreme
Court stated that "there can be no doubt that the legal expenses of
respondent were directly connected with 'carrying on' his busi-
ness .... It is plain that respondent's legal expenses were both 'ordi-
nary and necessary' if those words be given their commonly accepted
meaning."5 The Court was not dissuaded by arguments that the
law cannot recognize that it is necessary to conduct an ordinary law-
ful business in an unlawful manner and that it is not necessary to
defend an unnecessary activity." The only distinction preventing
Heininger from being directly in point with Tellier is that the prose-
cution in Heininger was not criminal." In Tellier, the Second Circuit,
to clarify its position on expenses associated with illegal activities,
stated that "to the extent that the equation of illegality with extra-
ordinary and unnecessary is not question begging, it is applying
special meaning to 'ordinary and necessary' which are not applied in
other connections."" The court went on to declare that "so long as
the expense arises out of the conduct of the business and is a re-
quired outlay it ought to be considered ordinary and necessary."5
This holding seems to be in accord with the Supreme Court's interp-
retation and application of section 162 in Heininger.
Having thus disposed of one of the arguments traditionally ad-
vanced in support of the "judicial amendment" merely by giving
effect to the statutory language and congressional intent, the court
turned to the public policy argument. The guide utilized here was
the Supreme Court's holding in Lilly v. Commissioner." The court
concluded that there was "no 'governmental declaration' of any
'sharply defined' national or state policy of discouraging the hiring
of counsel and the incurring of other legal expenses in defense against
a criminal charge" and that therefore such expenses could not be
disallowed."
The court further stated that "it is highly doubtful whether such
a policy [discouraging the hiring of counsel and the incurring of
other legal expenses in defense of a criminal charge] could exist in
the face of the Sixth Amendment's guaranty of the right to coun-
sel." 8 The implication is that even without the Lilly rule, the court's
50 Ibid.
5' 320 U.S. at 470, 471.
52 Id. at 471, 472.
53 See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
14 342 F.2d at 694.
" Ibid.53 See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
17 342 F.2d at 694.
51 Ibid.
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opinion at the time of the Burroughs case might have been different
if the sixth amendment had had its present significance."
IV. CONCLUSION
In light of post-Burroughs developments, i.e., the Lilly rule and
the clarification of the import of the sixth amendment, the over-
ruling of Burroughs was unavoidable. An implied public policy,
created by the courts before Congress had acted in the field and
before the Supreme Court had given the sixth amendment its pres-
ent full meaning, can no longer be recognized at the expense of
what is now an expressed national public policy."0
The rule formerly applied was authoritatively established over
three decades ago by the Second Circuit in the Burroughs case. This
rule was based on a purely judge-made policy of denying any ex-
pense which would lend encouragement to illegal practices and
activities or mitigate penalties imposed for transgressions of the law."1
The effect of the rule was to group legal expenses with fines and
penalties, although they are clearly distinguishable. The amount of
a fine is a legislative expression of what the exaction for wrong-
doing should be. In such a case disallowance may be necessary to
make the taxpayer actually bear the burden of the fine." Legal
expenses, on the other hand, are not a legislative expression of what
" As stated in a concurring opinion in Tellier, "Since Burroughs was decided, the federal
courts have given fuller meaning to the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 695. As an illustration
of this increased significance, the court cited Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(holding that the provision for counsel in a criminal trial is a fundamental right essential
to a fair trial and thus made obligatory on the states by the fourteenth amendment);
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (holding that counsel must be furnished to an
accused who is financially unable to retain his own counsel to defend him on federal charges) ;
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) (Court discussion illustrating the absolute
necessity of counsel under our legal system). The court also cited the Criminal Justice Act
of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964), which provides for governmental payment of reason-
able and necessary defense expenses for a defendant who is found to be financially unable to
provide his own counsel to defend against federal actions. Under this act, the right to coun-
sel expenses does not depend upon whether a defendant successfully asserts his innocence.
The court concluded that in order to be consistent with this clear manifestation of policy
that a defendant be represented by counsel regardless of the ultimate success or failure of
his defense, a financially able defendant should be allowed to deduct his ordinary and neces-
sary legal expenses incurred in an unsuccessful defense.
05A contrary argument was advanced by the Tax Court, where it was stated that "The
fact that an expenditure is in connection with a constitutionally guaranteed right does not
require the conclusion that the amount so expended is deductible as an ordinary and neces-
sary expense. . . .Even though the payments of legal fees in the unsuccessful defense of a
criminal prosecution may not be as proximately related to the illegal activity as the payment
of the fines and penalties involved in the Tank Truck Rentals case, such legal expenses flow
from the illegal acts." Walter F. Tellier, 22 T.C.M. 1062, 1071 (1963).
o See note 8 supra.
e"Inasmuch as fines are . . . criminal penalties imposed for violations of state laws,
their allowance as deductions would have the effect of mitigating the degree of punishment
and frustrating the purpose and effectiveness of those laws." Tank Truck Rentals, Inc., 26
T.C. 427, 440 (1956).
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the exaction for wrongdoing should be, and it is certainly a non
sequitur that the expenses for the defense should be nondeductible
merely because the proceeding gives rise to a nondeductible penalty.
Adherence to the Burroughs rule seeking to distinguish between
civil and criminal liability and successful and unsuccessful defenses
has led to anomalous, conflicting and arbitrary results," and much
adverse commentary. 4 The post-Burroughs Supreme Court cases65
of Heininger, Lilly, Johnson v. Zerbst, Powell v. Alabama, and
Gideon v. Wainwright shed new light on subjects involved in Bur-
roughs, but until Tellier its holding had never been re-examined in
this new light by an appellate court.
The unanimous holding of the Second Circuit en banc6 in Tellier
relegates section 162 to its proper function of determining net in-
come. The court stated that distinctions between civil and criminal
cases and between successful and unsuccessful defenses will no
longer be drawn. Under the Tellier rule, all future legal expenses
will be held deductible where they arise out of and are immediately
and proximately connected with, and are required for, the conduct
of a trade or business. This is a simple, workable rule that will ac-
63 Where the prosecution is classified as criminal and the defendant is found guilty or
pleads nolo contendere, the legal expenses are disallowed. Bell v. Commissioner, 320 F.2d 953
(8th Cir. 1963) (plea of noto contendere to indictment for tax evasion); Estate of G. A.
Buder, 22 T.C.M. 300, aff'd on other grounds, 330 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1964) (disbarment
proceeding classified as criminal); Standard Coat, Apron & Linen Serv., 40 T.C. 858 (1963)
(taxpayer finally pleaded nolo contendere after obtaining new trial); David R. Faulk, 26
T.C. 948 (1956) (action for defrauding the government). Legal expenses incurred in un-
successful attempt to avoid a prosecution ultimately resulting in a conviction are not de-
ductible. Tracy v. United States, 151 Ct. Cl. 618, 284 F.2d 379 (1960). But see Commis-
sioner v. Schwartz, 232 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1956). Legal expenses in government antitrust
actions are disallowed by the Commissioner; whereas such deductions are allowed in private
actions. Rev. Rul. 64-224, 1964 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 33, at 13, modifying G.C.M. 24377,
1944 Cum. Bull. 93, under which, following Heininger, legal expenses were held deductible
when incurred by a corporation convicted in a Sherman Antitrust Act criminal trial. Long-
horn Portland Cement Co., 3 T.C. 310, rev'd on other grounds, 148 F.2d 276 (5th Cir.
1945). On the other hand, legal expenses incurred by an individual in a successful defense
against criminal charges arising from his business are deductible. Commissioner v. Peoples-
Pittsburgh Trust Co., 60 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1932) (charge of conspiracy to defraud the
United States in tax matter). Also, legal expenses incurred in connection with an unsuc-
cessful defense against civil liability are deductible. Hopkins v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 166
(6th Cit. 1959) (fraud penalty assessed in tax evasion prosecution); John W. Clark, 30 T.C.
1330 (1958) (settlement of a civil liability for assault).
04 E.g., Arent, Inequities in Non-Deductibility of Fines, Penalties, Defense Expenses, 87
J. Accountancy 482 (1949); Brookes, Litigation Expenses and the Income Tax, 12 Tax L.
Rev. 241 (1957); Keesling, Illegal Transactions and the Income Tax, 5 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 26
(1958); Krassner, Can a Deduction for Legal Expenses be Against Public Policy?, 26
Taxes 447 (1948); Reid, Disallowance of Tax Deductions on Grounds of Public Policy-
A Critique, 17 Fed. B. J. 575 (1957); Stapleton, The Supreme Court Redefines Public
Policy, 30 Taxes 641 (1952); Comment, Business Expenses, Disallowances and Public Policy,
72 Yale L. J. 108 (1962); Note, Public Policy and Federal Income Tax Deductions, 51
Colum. L. Rev. 752 (1951); Note, Deduction of Business Expenses: Illegality and Public
Policy, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 852 (1941).
"5 See cases cited in note 59 supra.
" See note 40 supra.
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complish the purpose of the tax legislation and give stability and
predictability to the tax law relating to deductibility of legal ex-
penses. The anomalous, conflicting and arbitrary results of past de-
cisions will be avoided under the Tellier rule because the only de-
termination to be made on the deductibility of any legal expense
will be whether it "arises out of the conduct of the business and is
a required outlay." 7
The Supreme Court in Heininger qualified its allowance of the
deduction for legal expenses with requirements of good faith and
reasonableness. s Because the Tellier rule will be subject to such a
qualification there will be no danger of financially able defendants
spending large tax deductible sums on bad faith defenses and thereby
throwing a heavier burden on government prosecutions.
Application of the Tellier rule would seem to require allowance
of a deduction for legal expenses of unlawful businesses, even though
only aspects of the business in Tellier were unlawful. Salaries, rent,
and other expenses of actually earning income in the operation of an
illegal business are deductible.69 That the expense is "ordinary and
necessary" in the accepted meaning of the words is enough to permit
the deduction "unless it is clear that the allowance is a device to
avoid the consequences of violations of a law . . . or otherwise
contravenes the federal policy expressed in a statute or regula-
tion. . ."" There is no more justification for the disallowance of
attorneys' fees on the ground of public policy in the case of illegal
businesses than in the case of those which are legal.7' The disallow-
ance is based on the same implied public policy, recognized in Bur-
roughs, against sanctioning any expenditure that would lend en-
couragement to illegal practices and activities." While this argument
may seem more forceful in the case of an illegal business, the principle
is the same. Therefore, application of the Tellier rule would require
allowance of such expenses. To do otherwise would "put attorneys'
fees paid by one convicted of operating an illegal business in the same
category as bribes, protection payments, compensation of professional
murderers, and sundry other unlawful payments."7 Also, the allow-
67 342 F.2d at 694.
66 See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
6'2 CCH 1965 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. 5 1330.
'0 Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 29 (1958). The Court distinguished the Tank
Truck and Hoover cases on the ground that deduction of overweight fines paid by truckers
is a device to avoid the consequence of violations of a law. The Court also excepted allow-
ances which would frustrate sharply defined public policy expressed in a statute or regula-
tion, as Textile Mills Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
"'Brookes, Litigation Expenses and the Income Tax, 12 Tax L. Rev. 241, 269 (1957).
72 See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
7 Brookes, Litigation Expenses and the Income Tax, 12 Tax L. Rev. 241, 269 (1957).
[Vol. 19
